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ABSTRACT 
 
The IEC 61850 standard has contributed significantly to the substation management 
and automation process by incorporating the advantages of communications 
networks into the operation of power substations. However, this modernization 
process also involves new challenges in other areas. For example, in the field 
of security, several academic works have shown that the same attacks used in 
computer networks (DoS, Sniffing, Tampering, Spoffing among others), can also 
compromise the operation of a substation. This article evaluates the applicability of 
hierarchical clustering algorithms and statistical type descriptors (averages), in the 
identiﬁcation of anomalous patterns of traffic in communication networks for power 
substations based on the IEC 61850 standard. The results obtained show that, using 
a hierarchical algorithm with Euclidean distance proximity criterion and simple link 
grouping method, a correct classification is achieved in the following operation 
scenarios: 1) Normal trafﬁc, 2) IED disconnection, 3) Network discovery attack, 4) 
DoS attack, 5) IED spooﬁng attack and 6) Failure on the high voltage line. In addition, 
the descriptors used for the classification proved equally effective with other 
unsupervised clustering techniques such as K-means (partitional-type clustering), or 
LAMDA (diffuse-type clustering). 
 
Keywords: Hierarchical; clustering; unsupervised learning; IEC 61850; trafﬁc 
detection; power substation. 
 
RESUMEN 
 
El estándar IEC 61850 ha contribuido notablemente con el proceso de gestión y 
automatización de las subestaciones, al incorporar las ventajas de las redes de 
comunicaciones en la operación de las subestaciones de energía. Sin embargo, 
este proceso de modernización también involucra nuevos desafíos en otros 
campos. Por ejemplo, en el área de la seguridad, diversos trabajos académicos han 
puesto en evidencia que la operación de una subestación también puede ser 
comprometida por los mismos ataques utilizados en las redes de cómputo (DoS, 
Sniffing, Tampering, Spoffing entre otros). Este artículo evalúa la aplicabilidad de 
los algoritmos de agrupamiento no supervisado de tipo jerárquico y el uso de 
descriptores de tipo estadístico (promedios), en la identiﬁcación de patrones de 
tráﬁco anómalo en redes de comunicación para subestaciones eléctricas basadas 
en el estándar IEC 61850. Los resultados obtenidos demuestran que, utilizando un 
algoritmo jerárquico con criterio de proximidad distancia Euclidiana y método de 
agrupación vínculo simple, se logra una correcta clasificación de los siguientes 
escenarios de operación: 1) Tráfico normal, 2) Desconexión de dispositivo IED, 3) 
Ataque de descubrimiento de red, 4) Ataque de denegación de servicio, 5) Ataque 
de suplantación de IED y 6) Falló en la línea de alta tensión. Además, los 
descriptores utilizados para la clasificación demostraron ser robustos al lograrse 
idénticos resultados con otras técnicas de agrupamiento no supervisado de tipo 
particional como K-medias o de tipo difuso como LAMDA (Learning Algorithm 
Multivariable and Data Analysis).  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Smart Grid is a concept that aims to provide mechanisms for the generation and 
consumption of energy in a more efﬁcient and intelligent manner. This concept 
proposes the appropriation of data networks advantages to the grid operation in the 
area of control, communications and monitoring [1]. To reach this purpose, the 
modernization of the infrastructure that supports the generation, transmission, 
distribution and consumption of power has caused the emergence, within the 
communications network, of a variety of IP compliant devices that are interconnected 
through a network based in Ethernet technology [2]. 
 
Although the communication networks of modern electrical substations, based on 
the IEC61850 standard [3], provide major beneﬁts than the communication networks 
of traditional substations, companies are being cautious with their implementation 
due to the vulnerabilities evidenced through various research articles [4]. For 
example, in [5] and [6] Denial of Service (DoS) attacks were implemented. Also in 
[6] network trafﬁc was intercepted (snifﬁng). The interception and modiﬁcation of 
critical trafﬁc (tampering) was reached in [7] and [8], while a spooﬁng attack was 
achieved in [9].  
 
In this context, the anomalies or intrusion detections within power substation 
communications networks has become an important research topic, as a 
consequence of the serious damage that a failure may cause in this critical 
infrastructure. The majority of intrusion detection systems are focused on the 
detection of signatures (characteristic pattern associated with a particular intrusion 
or attack). However, for obvious reasons, this type of detection does not allow the 
detection of new types of attacks [10]. Hence, the study of unsupervised 
classiﬁcation techniques that can allow, through the wide recognition of the normal 
trafﬁc of the network, the identiﬁcation of possible abnormal states of operation is of 
special interest.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is to determine application of hierarchical 
clustering algorithms in the identiﬁcation of anomalous operation scenarios, 
speciﬁcally, in power substations communication networks based on the IEC 61850 
standard. 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The main notions of communication networks based on the IEC61850 standard are 
presented below, as well as the operating fundamentals of the hierarchical clustering 
techniques. 
  
 
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS IN POWER SUBSTATIONS 
 
In general, we can deﬁne a communication network of an automated power 
substation, as a set of devices with IP support, exchanging information via an 
Ethernet network that uses switches as interconnecting elements. This network is 
set up in order to ensure a communication platform supporting management, 
monitoring, synchronization, protection, control and sensing operations, within 
power substations. Currently, the substation automation process is guided by the 
IEC 61850 standard [3], which covers almost all aspects of a Substation Automation 
System (SAS). This standard provides recommendations to guarantee 
interoperability of devices from different manufacturers. Also, the standard deﬁnes 
how management, control and protection, and measurement devices 
intercommunicate inside a substation. As it can be seen in Figure 1, the model 
proposed by the standard IEC 61850 is hierarchical, where three levels are 
identiﬁed: station, bay and process; interconnected via the process bus and the 
station bus. 
 
 
Figure 1. Communication model for the IEC 61850 standard. 
Source: The author. 
  
 
 
The process level is composed of actuators, measuring devices called MUs, 
Ethernet switches and yard equipments such as: Current Transformers (CTs), 
Voltage Transformers (VTs) and breakers. In the bay level, we ﬁnd protection and 
control IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices), while at the station level Ethernet 
switches and communication network management devices are located. The IEC 
61850 standard also deﬁnes four types of communication services, in order to 
ensure the correct operation of the network (see Table 1) [2]. 
 
Table 1. Communication services deﬁned in the IEC 61850 standard 
Type of Service Description 
 
ACSI (Abstract 
Communication 
Service Interface) 
Deﬁned in IEC 61850-7-2, addresses the basic requirements for 
the process of exchanging information. With this aim, the MMS 
(Manufacturing Message Speciﬁcation protocol) is used to 
transport operational information for the management of the 
substation between the user interface system and the IEDs. 
GOOSE (Generic 
Object Oriented 
Substation Event) 
Deﬁned in IEC 61850-8-1 for the purpose of distributing event 
data (commands, alarms, indications, trip messages), between 
IEDs across entire substation network. 
SMV / SV (Sampled 
Measured Values) 
Speciﬁed in IEC 61850-9-2, is used to transmit analog values 
(current and voltage) from the MUs to the IEDs. 
TS (Time 
Synchronization) 
Uses the PTP (Precision Time Protocol) for ensuring clock 
synchronization among devices of a distributed system. 
Source: The author. 
 
According to the IEC 61850-5 and IEC 61850-8 recommendations, the 
communication services are mapped into different communication stacks according 
of their performance requirements (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Communication stack under the IEC 61850 standard. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING ALGORITHMS 
 
A clustering algorithm is a multivariate statistical procedure aiming to group, or 
classify, the elements of a data space into a compact, separate and homogeneous 
groups called clusters or classes. In particular, the unsupervised clustering 
algorithms aim to discover the composition of the classes or groupings to which the 
elements can belong without having apriori information about the structure of the 
data. This clustering must guarantee that the degree of natural association is high 
among members of the same group and low among members of different groups 
[11]. The unsupervised clustering algorithms are divided into two major categories: 
hierarchical and partitional. The partitional algorithms divide the data space into a 
speciﬁed number of groups, following an optimization criterion. While the hierarchical 
algorithms generate a structured organization of nested groups, which is 
represented by a classiﬁcation tree known as a dendrogram (see Figure 3). The 
dendrogram illustrates how the algorithm groups the elements step by step and, 
observing the structure of their branches and the distance among them, the diagram 
shows the degree of similarity between the different clusters. In addition, depending 
on where the cut level of the dendrogram is established, the number of classes for 
the classiﬁcation algorithm is deﬁned [11].  
 
 
Figure 3. Dendogram for a space of 5 elements (a, b, c, d, e). 
Source: The author. 
 
The techniques of hierarchical clustering are classiﬁed into two categories: based on 
agglomeration and based on division (see Figure 4). Agglomerative algorithms, or 
bottom up approach, start the analysis with as many groups as there are elements 
in the data space. From these initial units, groups are formed ascending, until at the 
end of the process all treated cases are within in a single set. With an opposite 
approach, the division-based algorithms, also called top down, begin with a set that 
encompasses all observations, and from this initial cluster, through successive 
divisions, smaller and smaller groups are formed. At the end of the process, there 
are as many groupings as cases have been treated. 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Process types in the hierarchical clustering. 
Source: The author. 
 
The operation scheme of the agglomerative hierarchical algorithms, classiﬁcation 
mechanism used in our approach, is simple (See Table 2). However, for its 
execution, it is necessary to deﬁne apriori: 1) what are the measures of association 
that will allow measuring the proximity of individuals (distance/similarity) and 2) how 
it can determine when two clusters or classes can be grouped [11]. 
Table 2. Agglomerative hierarchical algorithm 
1:  Calculate the distance matrix 
2:  Each element is deﬁned as a class  
3:  repeat 
4:     Group the two closest classes 
5:     Update distance matrix  
6:  until Get a single cluster 
Source: The author. 
 
There are different metrics to determine the proximity of the individuals to be 
classiﬁed, considering their qualities. For example, if the characteristics of individuals 
are quantitative, a measure of distance will be used as an indicator of proximity. On 
the contrary, if the attributes of the individuals are qualitative, a similarity index will 
be used as proximity metric. Among the most used distances are Euclidean distance, 
Manhattan distance, Minkowski distance, Pearson correlation, cosine vector, among 
others. The distance used in this approach is the Euclidean distance (Equation 1), 
as a consequence of the achieved results (Subsection 2.5). 
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Having deﬁned the proximity measure (Euclidean distance), it is necessary to deﬁne 
the criteria for identifying which are the closest classes to its corresponding grouping. 
  
In the agglomerative hierarchical clustering, different mechanisms are distinguished 
to achieve this objective. These include Minimum or single-linkage clustering, 
Maximum or complete-linkage clustering, Mean or average-linkage clustering and 
Centroid linkage clustering. Figure 5 shows the clustering criteria used in these 
techniques. For example, in single-linkage, the clusters are joined considering the 
smallest of the distances between the closest members of different groups; while, in 
complete-linkage, the clusters come together considering the smallest of the 
distances between the more distant members of different groups. In the technique 
of the average-linkage, the clusters are united considering the lowest average 
distance between all the pairs of elements of both sets [11]. 
 
 
Figure 5. Criteria for grouping in the hierarchical clustering. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To illustrate the effectiveness of the hierarchical algorithms as a mechanism for the 
classiﬁcation of the operation scenarios in power substation communications, a test 
scenario was designed and implemented in an isolated and controlled environment. 
The description of the implemented testbed, the deﬁned operating scenarios, the 
descriptors used and the classiﬁcation process carried out are discussed below.  
 
 
DATA CAPTURE 
 
To capture the network trafﬁc, a prototype of a test communications network 
(testbed) was implemented in an isolated and controlled environment (see Figure 6). 
This network topology was composed of a generic interconnection device (Ethernet 
switch); two IEDs of reference ABB REM630 and ABB REG620, operating in the 
  
modes described in Figure 6; a PC for the registration and monitoring of the events 
transmitted through the IEC 61850 standard and the capture of network trafﬁc 
through the WIRESHARK application; and a PC (attacker) to execute intrusions such 
as: the network topology discovering through the NMAP, the execution of a DoS 
attack using HPING3 and the fabrication of an spooﬁng attack for Goose messages 
sent by the publisher through the use of the OSTINATO application. The behavior of 
the high voltage line was emulated by the ISA DRTS66 test equipment.  
 
 
Figure 6. Test communications network (testbed). 
Source: The author. 
 
 
On the communication network described in Figure 6, six different operating 
scenarios were deﬁned: 1) Normal trafﬁc, 2) IED disconnection, 3) Network 
discovery attack, 4) DoS attack, 5) IED spooﬁng attack and 6) Failure on the high 
voltage line. The operating conditions of the described scenarios were generated 
sequentially and captured in the equipment called Registration and monitoring; to 
get a capture of 20 minutes of trafﬁc with 226.000 frames (PCAP ﬁle).  
 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF DESCRIPTOR 
 
In this stage, a speciﬁc set of characteristics or attributes must be deﬁned, so that 
each element of the data space is represented by a collection of descriptors. These 
descriptors will allow identifying the features that affect the classiﬁcation problem. 
This initial choice reﬂects the researcher’s opinion about the purpose of their 
classiﬁcation [11]. 
 
In the ﬁeld of detection of network trafﬁc patterns through unsupervised classiﬁcation 
mechanisms, the studies use two types of attributes as illustrated in Table 3. 
1) Attributes based on the network ﬂow, it means, on the use of the value of 
a communication protocol ﬁeld (IP, UDP, TCP) or MAC address. 2) Statistical 
  
attributes, such as the average of a particular type of packets, the distribution 
function that the parameters of the packet follow, among others.  
 
 
Table 3. Descriptors used in the recognition of trafﬁc patterns through the use of non-
supervised algorithms 
Title Algorithm Descriptors 
Learning rules and 
clusters for anomaly 
detection in network 
traffic [10] 
Outliers detection 
with k-NN 
Probabilistic. P (W|U) where U = 
{SrcIp=128.1.2.3, DestIp=128.4.5.6} and W = 
{DestPort=80} 
Traffic anomaly 
detection using k-
means clustering 
[12] 
K-means 
protocol type, source IP address, destination IP 
address, source port, destination port 
P2P traffic 
identification and 
optimization using 
fuzzy c-means 
clustering [13] 
Fuzzy c-means 
NumberofPacketsSent/ReceivedforaFlow,  
Protocol, DurationoftheFlow, SourcePort, 
DestinationPort TotalNumberofPackets, 
MeanPacketLength, MeanPayloadLlength, 
MeanPacketInter-arrivalTime, 
AverageSent/ReceivedPacketSize, Variances, 
ByteRatio’s    
CoCoSpot: 
Clustering and 
Recognizing Botnet 
Command and 
Control Channels 
using Traffic 
Analysis [14] 
Hierarchical 
clustering 
transport layer protocol l4p (TCP or UDP), 
source IP address sip, destination IP address 
dip, port destination dp 
PeerShark: flow-
clustering and 
conversation 
generation for 
malicious peer-to-
peer traffic 
identification [15] 
X-means (K-
means that does 
not require 
knowing apriori 
the number of 
classes)  
Src. IP, Dest. IP, Src. port, Dest. port, Proto 
(TCP or UDP), Protocol, Packets per second 
(f/w), Packets per second (b/w), Avg. Payload 
size (f/w), and Avg. Payload size (b/w), with ‘f/w’ 
and ‘b/w’ signifying the forward and the 
backward direction of the flow, respectively  
An unsupervised 
approach for trafﬁc 
trace sanitization 
based on the 
entropy spaces [16] 
K-means 
StartTime, EndTime, source IP address, source 
port number, destination IP address, destination 
port number, the number of packets and the 
amount of bytes in the ﬂow. 
  
Classiﬁcation of 
Network Trafﬁc 
Using Fuzzy 
Clustering for 
Network Security 
[17] 
Fuzzy c-means 
(FCM) 
duration (seconds of the connection), src_bytes 
(data from src to dst), num_failed_logins, 
root_shell, 
num_access_ﬁles(operationsonaccesscontrolﬁl
es),serror_rate(percentofconnectionswith“SYN” 
errors), same_srv_rate (percent of connections 
to same service), srv_count (connections to 
same service in past 2 seconds). 
Network Intrusion 
Detection with 
Threat Agent 
Proﬁling [18] 
K-means, PAM 
(Partitioning 
Around Medoids), 
y CLARA 
(Clustering LARge 
Application) 
ID, source IP address, target IP address, 
category, category count, protocol, protocol 
count, port, duration, start timestamp, end 
timestamp, and ISP. 
Bot detection using 
unsupervised 
machine learning 
[19] 
K-means, X-
Means y 
agrupamiento EM 
(Expectation 
Maximization) 
dstport(destinationport),maxbpktl(largestpacket
sentinthebackwarddirection),maxfptkl(largest 
packet sent in the forward direction), fpsh cnt 
(times the PSH ﬂag was set in packets travelling 
in the forward direction (0 for UDP) and min fptkl 
(smallest packet sent in the forward direction). 
Source: The author. 
 
Our study identiﬁed that four descriptors are enough for an adequate classiﬁcation 
of the proposed operation scenarios, since we get identical results using different 
classiﬁcation algorithms (Subsection 2.7). Table 4 shows the descriptors used, three 
of statistical type (n_frames, n_goose, n_arp) and one based on the network ﬂow 
(goose_seqnum). 
 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptors used in this study 
Descriptor Identified situation 
n_frames, average of the 
total number of frames 
captured in the time window 
(10 seconds) 
DoS attack. This attack, independent of the service to 
attack, generates a huge amount of trafﬁc on the network 
in a very short period of time. 
n_goose, average of 
GOOSE packets captured in 
the time window (10 
seconds) 
IED Publisher disconnection or failure in the high voltage 
line. When an IED is disconnected, the average of GOOSE 
packets in the time window goes to zero. Similarly, when 
there is a fault in the high voltage line, the average of 
GOOSE messages increases as a consequence of the 
event. 
  
n_arp, average of ARP 
packets captured in the time 
window (10 seconds) 
Execution of a network discovery by an intruder. Most 
network discovery attacks use the ARP protocol operation 
scheme as a strategy to discover the stations connected to 
the network. 
goose_seqnum, SeqNum 
ﬁeld of the GOOSE packet 
header 
Spooﬁng attack of an IED Publisher. One of the evidences 
of this attack is the anomalous change of the SeqNum ﬁeld 
values in the GOOSE header. These values are registered 
in sequence, therefore a value out of order implies an 
intrusion. This descriptor will take the value of one if there 
is an anomalous change in this ﬁeld. Otherwise, its value 
will be zero. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
DATA PRE-PROCESSING  
 
Once the descriptors that will characterize the elements of our data space were 
identiﬁed, the trafﬁc capture ﬁle (PCAP) was processed in order to obtain this set of 
elements. For this purpose, we developed a script in the LUA programming language 
[20] to be executed into the TSHARK application. In this way, it was possible to get 
a set of 110 elements. Each element, with four descriptors, shows the behavior of 
the network trafﬁc in a time window of 10 seconds (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Preprocessing data scheme. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 8 shows the behavior of the normalized descriptors along the data space 
obtained, for each of the described operation scenarios. 
 
  
 
Figure 8. Behavior of the normalized descriptors. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
 
CLASSIFICATION PROCESS 
 
In this stage, the clustering algorithm is responsible of assigning to each element of 
the data space, a category or class (set of elements that share certain 
characteristics, which also allow differentiating them from the rest). The classiﬁcation 
process of this study was carried out using of the hclust function of the software for 
statistical analysis R. Although there is no single criterion to determine which 
measure of association is the most appropriate to measure the proximity of 
individuals (distances/similarity), and which is the most convenient mechanism for 
grouping classes, it is recommended to test and compare the results with different 
methods. Here, we opted to experiment with Euclidean distance and Gower distance 
as proximity metrics [21], along with single-linkage, complete-linkage, and average-
linkage techniques as strategies for grouping classes. From the tests carried out, the 
best classiﬁcation scheme was achieved using single-linkage and Euclidean 
distance. This combination allowed identifying the six operation scenarios described 
through six classes while the other schemes required at least 7 classes to correctly 
identify the six scenarios. Next, Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate the structure of the 
dendrogram and the classiﬁcation process obtained according to the behavior of the 
descriptors. 
 
  
 
Figure 9. Dendogram with a cut of 6 classes. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Assignment of classes with agglomerative hierarchical algorithm. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
The tests carried out show that the Gower distance and the Euclidean distance 
presented similar base structures, but different clustering structure. In the same way, 
despite that the class clustering scheme was changed (simple, complete and 
average), at the base of the dendrogram it was always possible to identify each one 
  
of the proposed scenarios, what changes in the structure is the way they clustered. 
What becomes clear is that by ﬁxing a cut-off point of the dendrogram to six or seven 
classes, it was possible to identify all the deﬁned operating scenarios. However, the 
best result was reached using Euclidean distance with single-linkage. 
 
Analyzing the structure of the dendrogram (see Figure 9), it shows that all operating 
scenarios can be clearly recognized. However, we expected that all the clusters 
related to anomalous operation scenarios were grouped in a dominant single class 
of failure (failure root class), it means to get the normal trafﬁc class (A) completely 
separated of failure classes (B, C, D, E, F). 
 
VALIDATION 
 
The results reached through an agglomerative hierarchical algorithm motivate a very 
qualitative interpretation, which can be subjective from the researcher perspective. 
Hence, it is recommended to compare the achieved results with other types of 
solutions, where similar results will indicate the presence of a structure in the data. 
Thus, we explored other solution strategies using partitional and diffuse 
unsupervised algorithms: K-means [22] and LAMDA (Learning Algorithm 
Multivariable and Data Analysis) [23]. The results obtained using K-means (see 
Figure 11), deﬁning in advance the k parameter equal six (number of operation 
scenarios), shows how this algorithm identiﬁes all the proposed scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 11. Assignment of classes with K-means partitional algorithm. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the classiﬁcation achieved results using the LAMDA algorithm 
with a Gaussian adaptation function, fuzzy logic connectors Min-Max and a 
requirement level of 0,6.LAMDA algorithm is incorporated in the P3S application 
(DISCO Group, LAAS-CNRS). This application also allows extracting the 
membership graphic associated with each of the classes, Global Adequacy Degree 
  
(GAD), see Figure 13. The results obtained were in line with the K-means 
classiﬁcation. 
 
 
Figure 12. Assignment of classes with diffuse LAMDA algorithm. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
Figure 13. Membership graph for classes in the data space. 
Source: The author. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The selection of descriptors is key in a classiﬁcation process, therefore, a preliminary 
analysis to determine their level of contribution is necessary. Likewise, a 
transformation or pre-treatment of the data may be required, as occurred in this work, 
where three statistical descriptors (averages) and one network ﬂow descriptor 
(SeqNum ﬁeld in GOOSE packet header) were used.  
 
The hierarchical clustering strategy allows, through the dendrogram, to make a 
preliminary exploration of the possible grouping structures present in the data space, 
  
when the number of descriptors is greater than 3. In this way, the techniques of 
hierarchical clustering are an excellent tool to deal with completely unknown data. 
 
The results evidence the strength in the mechanisms of unsupervised classiﬁcation 
to identify all the proposed operating scenarios by using different techniques 
(partitional, hierarchical and diffuse). Also, the results demonstrate that these 
algorithms can be useful in several scenarios, for example, the trafﬁc classiﬁcation 
in power substation communication networks. 
 
Finally, the fact of getting identical results through different classiﬁcation algorithms 
demonstrates the strength of the selected descriptors for the identiﬁcation of patterns 
in this particular case of application. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents a practical case of how unsupervised clustering algorithms can 
be used as an effective tool for the identiﬁcation of operation scenarios, in power 
substations communication networks based on the IEC 61850 standard. However, 
there are still numerous application ﬁelds to explore in this area. Particularly the 
detection of new anomalies, or unknown operation scenarios, is a difﬁcult task for a 
classiﬁcation algorithm. In our approach, the selection of the descriptors was 
successful, given the knowledge of the operating scenarios in advance. They proved 
to be robust obtaining identical results with other unsupervised clustering techniques 
such as K-means (partitional-type clustering), or LAMDA (diffuse-type clustering). 
The challenge then is to ensure that the clustering algorithm is able to classify the 
normal trafﬁc scenario in a robust manner, in that way the other scenarios will be 
used to notify anomalous processes in the communications network. 
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